Tempus fugit II …..

Time flees as the Latin tag says (perhaps more commonly recognised as ‘Time Flies’) and it certainly seems to be the case with Data Retention.

It seems just a short time ago that we were watching the progress of the Directive through the European parliamentary system, from introduction through discussion (is that really the right word for the actions of the UK Presidency in 2005?) to amendment and then to final acceptance and transposition to national law.

In the UK we were there at the beginning, transposing the first parts to apply to fixed line and mobile telephony. 18 months later came the inclusion of Internet data. The interesting bits were the differences between national transpositions - some elected for retention for as little as 6 months, others for 12 and some for as long as 24 months (but would have liked longer). The UK opted to allow for reimbursement of capital expenditure and the provision in relation to Internet data seems to pay only slight compliance - requiring retention of data only where the national authorities deem that it is necessary.

Some member states have only brought data retention within national law in recent months - Portugal in August 2009, Italy at the end of 2009 and Poland only at the beginning of 2010 (UK, 1st phase Sept 2006, 2nd phase March 2008). There remain a number of member states where data retention has still not been applied - Austria, Belgium, Greece, Ireland, Luxembourg, Romania, Sweden - so much for the idea of ensuring a common approach to law enforcement.

But, time flies. The implementation of the Data Retention Directive provided for an evaluation of the Directive. The time has now come for that evaluation and a number of conferences and meetings have taken place. The results of evaluation will be published later in the year, probably in October 2010. After that, the Commission will begin the processes that will lead to proposals for a revised Directive, probably by the end of 2011 with expected implementation by 2014.

It is too early to say what that new Directive may include, but undoubtedly there will be pressure to expand the range of retained data to include a wider range of Information society services - The Crusher would expect to see pressure for the inclusion of social networking data and web site access. There may be some agreement on a reduction in the range of the approved time scales -although as most members currently retain for 12 months this is unlikely to affect the majority (including the UK).

The evaluation report from the Commission does include some interesting data relating to the number of requests for access to retained data in 2008.

Clearly there are wide variations in the raw number of requests with France and the UK heading the number of actual requests. Of course, both have fairly high populations so it is reasonable that there should be a large number of requests. But, when the figures are compared against the national populations the data requests become more interesting. the right hand column shows the number of data requests per 100,000 of population. Under this order, Lithuania shows a massive 2239 requests per 100K with the UK behind France at a much lower 769. Yet Cyprus only requests data at the rate of 3 per 100,000!

Of course, there will be variations in what is perceived as relevant crime and the use of data to locate rather than to determine specific use. It may well be that the larger number of requests are being used more as a location tool than as a more detailed investigatory procedure. But, the figure for Lithuania is so much greater than others it does rather beg the question what use is being made of retained data in that small state? Perhaps there remains an investigatory throwback to a prevous regime - although the lower (far lower) figures for neighbouring Estonia and Latvia may negate that suggestion.

Interesting data - it will be interesting to watch what comes out of the Commission in late summer/autumn 2010.

Emergency, which service ……..?

Most people are familiar with the process for making an emergency call - whether it is to the Police, Fire Service, Ambulance or Coastguard. Pick up a phone and dial 999 - or 112 as the pan-European common emergency call number.

When the call is answered by the emergency service operator at the telco, the operator will ask you which service you require and will ask you to confirm the number you are calling from. No problems there.

The operator will see the calling line number displayed in front of them and can immediately cross-reference with reverse look up to identify the location. OK, no problems there - but hold on a minute, what happens if you are not using a land-line?

Technology has moved on and there can no longer be an assumption that all users are calling from a fixed land-line. Emergency calls can be made from a mobile number and, increasingly, from a Voice over IP phone (VoIP). Now, these latter two present something of a problem. Mobile numbers are not geographic (they do not have a specific regional location exchange code) and can be made from pretty much anywhere (except in my house where the mobile does not work!). Emergency operators can access data from the mobile providers to locate the cell where the call is being made from - and triangulation from a number of base stations can provide a fairly accurate geographic location of the calling phone. That’s what law enforcement do when they want to track a criminal or suspect target - the mobile phone is a very effective piece of electronic tracking gadgetry sitting in your pocket. You don’t have to make a call, the phone will register itself with the local cell whenever it is switched on and will thereby giveaway its position.

OK, again, no real problems there. Problems arise with VoIP. There may be a number associated with a VoIP call but it may be a geographic number and the geographic number assigned to the call may bear no relevance to the actual geographic location of the VoIP handset or software. This may be connecting through any IP link - perhaps a fixed line broadband circuit or perhaps a WiFi connection in a public place (cafe, pub, airport etc.).

The Ofcom General Conditions of Service require providers to make details of callers available to emergency service operators. For fixed line and for mobile calls that is fine - the provider has all the data and can cross-reference databases. For VoIP there is a problem - the VoIP service is likely to be provided by a different service provider to the underlying IP transport. The VoIP provider may have a record of the geographic number associated with the call and may be able to reference that to a customer - but cannot tell whether or not the customer is at the location they have. The IP address used for the call and included within the packet data will be allocated by the ISP providing the transport layer - there may be no quick look-up between the VoIP provider and the ISP to determine the location and user of the IP address. It is quite possible that the VoIP user could log in from a range of IPs during a single day - particularly if they are connecting using WiFi access points.

The problem can have tragic consequences. A Canadian family called the emergency services using a VoIP service - the trackback from their initial service registration indicated a location in Toronto so that was where the medical team was sent. Unfortunately the family were hundreds of miles away in Calgary and had not updated the location information held by the VoIP provider.

To overcome the problem the emergency services want to be able to make a quick look up request to ISPs to determine the telephone line reference (CBUK record) for the line on which the VoIP call originated. That might seem straightforward but the practicalities are much less so. There is no standard format for ISP customer service records and there is no standard interface that will allow an external agency to access and requues information from those databases. Emergency service developers have suggested that ISPs should install systems that will allow real-time look-up requests from the emergency service operator. The operator would identify the call as a VoIP origin, identify the associated IP address, refer that to a central look-up registry to identify the ISP (RIPE?) and then pass the request to the ISP who would be expected to return the CBUK reference for the line. All this in real-time and in no longer than it has taken you to read this last paragraph.

The implementation of the Data Retention Directive at a European level has meant that there have been developments to create a standardised form of data request - ETSI standards. Implementing these may be fine for the larger operators who have teams of developers and can bear the costs. But for the medium and smaller level ISPs there will be a real problem - substantial development costs and quite likely whole changes to back end and Internet facing systems. It is quite likely that the smaller ISPs will simply not have the resources to be able to comply.

The Crusher can see another problem here. Once an interface system is in place then a remote operator will be able to input an IP address and return a telephone line reference which can be used to determine a location. That is exactly the type of information that typical Section 22 notices issued under the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act (RIPA) often require - law enforcement agencies can issue a notice requiring an ISP to provide details of a user. Requests often cite a date, time and IP address - and require the ISP to identify the user. If that can be done automatically by the emergency operator then it will not be long before other parts of law enforcement agencies (LEAs) identify the route as a rapid way to investigative data. Politicians will trot out the tired old lines about importance for public safety, citizens have nothing to fear etc. And will then introduce legislative changes that permit LEAs to process automatic data requests.

Any development for emergency use will have to be developed with extensive safeguards and strict controls. These must ensure that access can only be made in genuine emergency situations and that it is not possible to investigators to access for alternate purposes. Equally, it must not be possible for other organisations to attempt to access data - for example, for rights owners to try to identify end users flagged up as potential copyright infringers.

The emergency request is fairly self-explanatory. The problem is the likelihood and the inevitability of mission creep.

May we live in interesting times ……!

The next week (week beginning 27th April 2009) appears to have the makings of a rather interesting time. Perhaps the ancient Chinese proverb was indeed close to the truth.

Later this week we expect the Home Office to publish details of the Intercept Modernisation Programme and the Communications Data Bill. Readers will remember that the Bill was originally trailed in the Government’s Draft Legislative Programme published in summer 2008 but was quietly dropped from the Queen’s Speech later in the year for ‘ additional public consultation.’

Well, it seems that time for consultation is here and we now expect the Home Office to publish the consultation document and details of the Intercept Modernisation Programme (IMP). The Daily Telegraph today (Saturday 25th April) printed a front page story to indicate that the consultation will resurrect the ideas of a single centralised database to hold details of all telephone calls, emails, web access etc. The Telegraph reports (in print - it does not appear on their web site - why not?) that the Information Commissioner has reiterated his opposition to the database, indicating that he considers this to be a major intrusion into privacy.

The Government, of course, appear to be trotting out the same old story - we need to monitor web access, email etc. in order to track terrorists and serious organised crime. And, if recent performance is anything to go by, also those sending their children to school and those ‘allowing’ their dogs to foul the pavement.

There are fundamental issues of privacy and rights of the individual at stake here. The current authoritarian and nanny obsessed government simply cannot be allowed to rail-road this legislation through. Remember the sentient words of Benjamin Franlink in 1775, ‘Those who give up essential liberty to obtain a little temporary safety, deserve neither liberty nor safety.’

What we need is a little real risk assessment and some real truths - not the one-sided ‘business case’ that we have seen with other consultations. This is a fundamental issue of rights and the ability of the Government to spy on its own citizens. Levels of control as are being suggested have only existed in the most heinous totalitarian regimes - we cannot sleep walk into allowing a British government to overturn centuries of hard won reforms for a short term gain. As Franklin suggests, the cost to the people is just too great.